According to both deontologists and consequentialists, if there is a reason to promote the general happiness – or to promote any other state of affairs unrelated to one's own projects or self-interest – then the reason must apply to everyone. This view seems almost self-evident; to challenge it is to challenge the way we think of moral reasons. I contend, however, that the view depends on the unwarranted assumption that the only way to restrict the application scope of a reason (...) for action is by restricting it to those agents whose interests or projects are involved in the reason. In fact normative theories may coherently restrict application scopes in other ways. Thus we must take seriously the possibility that the reason to promote the general happiness, although genuine, does not apply to everyone. (shrink)

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child risks harm to adolescents insofar as it encourages not only poor decision making by adolescents but also parenting styles that will have an adverse impact on the development of mature decision-making capacities in them. The empirical psychological and neurophysiological data weigh against augmenting and expression of the rights of children. Indeed, the data suggest grounds for expanding parental authority, not limiting its scope. At the very least, any adequate appreciation of (...) the moral claims regarding the authority of parents with respect to the decision-making capacity of adolescents needs to be set within an understanding of the psychological and neurophysiological facts regarding the development of adolescent decision-making capacity. (shrink)

I give the label “ethical pluralism” to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maximally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules or principles to agents – should any (...) exist – who adhere to a competing valid moral view. Given the usual conception of accepting a moral view, an ethical pluralist cannot honestly accept a traditional moral view. Consequently, I argue, an ethical pluralist is committed to the view that all traditional moral views are invalid. Given the likelihood of ethical pluralism, this conclusion is alarming. I set forth a weak conception of accepting a moral view that is designed to allow an ethical pluralist honestly to accept a traditional moral view. In particular, my conception is designed to explain how someone can (a) be guided by the view that she accepts; (b) accept her own moral view while rationally not accepting competing views that she thinks are equally valid; and (c) not be prepared to prescribe morally to those who are following other valid views. Central to my formulation are what I call a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people’s wrong behavior, together with acceptance of decisive moral reasons for oneself that are generated by the valid moral view that one accepts. (shrink)

B C Hurst; Means, Ends, Content and Objectives in Curriculum Planning: a critique of Sockett and Hirst, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1.

B C Hurst; Teaching, Telling and Changes in Belief, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 215–224, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

B C Hurst; Teaching, Telling and Changes in Belief, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 215–224, https://doi.org/10.1111/.

B C Hurst; Cooper on Equality and Excellence in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–124, https://doi.org/1.

IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS—A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.

The systems approach to niche presented herein stands as an example of the unifying potential of mathematical system theory when applied to concepts and principles of ecology. Beginning with subjective concepts from the naturalistic tradition, the niche was framed in the formalism of general system theory. So modeled, it appeared as a restriction of a more general construct, the environ. Both niches and environs are implementable in the context of ecosystem models, and with the growing ability of ecologists to construct (...) such models, system theoretic niches and environs both should serve in the future to clarify old problems of ecology, and make it possible to raise new classes of problems. The nature of niches, always difficult conceptually for the ecologist, may now give way to further development, both theoretical and empirical. (shrink)

Originally published in 1967 as the fifth edition of a 1935 original, this book addresses the teaching of various kinds of geography to secondary school students. The text includes suggestions for classwork and possible field courses, in order that geography may have 'its maximum educational effect'. This book will be of value to anyone interested in the history of geography education in Britain.

Climo and Howells argue that a comparison of counterfactual statements is the best approach to causation in historical analysis. In historical explanation, it is often difficult to distinguish causes from effects, real causes from potential ones, and epiphenomena from either causes or effects. The symbolic statement "A causes B" describes the actual world. Two statements using the parameters A and B may be formed which do not describe the actual world. By determining which of the statements, "If not-A then B" (...) and "If not-A then not-B," is closer to the actual world, one can conclude whether A is a cause of B. Despite their claims, however, Climo and Howells do not prove that their method is superior to others in dealing with effects and preemption. Their method also has internal difficulties when dealing with epiphenomena and relations to the actual world. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does (...) have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief. (shrink)

Philosophers of history can be divided into two schools, the realist/ empiricist and the instrumentalist/ constructionist. Both accept that the evidence of the past is given. The "myth of evidence," however, obscures the problematic character of description and prediction as essential activities of historians and archaeologists. To choose between competing claims about a particular event one does not choose between the individual descriptions. Rather, one chooses those narratives with the wider network of truth statements and predictive powers. Once the "myth (...) of evidence" is dispelled, the philosophy of history should provide analyses and programs of data-description and prediction. (shrink)

B C Hurst; Cooper on Equality and Excellence in Education, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–124, https://doi.org/1.

W. D. Ross’s ethical theory requires us somehow to compare the metaphorical “weights” of different prima facie duties, but it leaves mysterious how this might be done. The formulation of a procedure to achieve such a comparison would be desirable on practical, theoretical, and pedagogical grounds. I formulate a procedure that is congenial to Ross’s theory. Central to my procedure are instructions to characterize the weight of each prima facie duty with respect to (a) the general stringency of this kind (...) of duty, (b) the stringency of this particular duty relative to other duties of its own kind, and (c) the degree to which the duty specifically demands the particular action that it favors in a given case. The procedure leads to a determination of one’s actual, all-things-considered duty in some cases but not in all. (shrink)

What criteria shall we use to evaluate normative theories of practical rationality? one answer is provided by a version of the wide reflective equilibrium model (wre). What criteria shall we use to evaluate models on the level of wre? one answer is provided by a variant of the historical philosophy of science model. The latter answer may support the former.

Bradford C Bemiss, Chad A WittDepartment of Internal Medicine, Division of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Washington University School of Medicine, St Louis, MO, USA: Chronic rejection is a major cause of death after the first year following lung transplantation. Bronchiolitis obliterans is the most common pathologic finding on biopsy, characterized by fibrous granulation tissue, which obliterates the lumen of the bronchiole. Clinically, in the absence of tissue for pathology, BO syndrome refers to a progressive irreversible drop in the forced (...) expiratory volume in 1 second. Recently, a broader definition of chronic rejection, termed "chronic lung allograft dysfunction", has been used to encompass a more inclusive definition of posttransplant dysfunction. Recently, the lung transplant community has come to realize that chronic rejection may be the final common result after repetitive epithelial insults. Acute rejection, infection, and alloreactivity to mismatched HLA antigens are a few of these insults that damage the surface of the bronchioles. Recent evidence of autoimmunity to the normally hidden structural proteins collagen V and K-α1 tubulin have been correlated with a BO phenotype as well, perhaps correlating the epithelial damage with a mechanism for developing BO lesions. Many immunomodulatory medications and treatments have been studied for effectiveness for the treatment of chronic lung allograft dysfunction. New drugs, which more precisely target the immune system, are being developed and tested. Further study is required, but recent advances have improved our understanding of the pathogenesis and potential intervention for this common and deadly complication of lung transplantation.Keywords: lung transplant, bronchiolitis obliterans syndrome, rejection. (shrink)